Introduction
The governing power of a state has had the prerogative to award national honours to citizens on behalf of the whole of society since antiquity. Throughout the centuries, such government honours have developed from simple wreaths of laurels, to titles of ennoblement, into modern day orders of merit. Orders of merit typically carry no economic benefits and cost little to produce; most often they consist of crosses produced in gilded metal. Instead they derive their value from their visibility as they are worn to both festive and everyday occasions. French political scientist Olivier Ihl (2002) argues that these quite modest emblems function as a 'systematic instrument of governance'. That is to say, they serve as an instrument to signal exemplarity by publicly making examples of behaviour which goes beyond mere legal obligations; as an instrument of instilling citizen's deference to the state; as an instrument of public power that manifest the power of the person awarding the decoration; and as an instrument to influence the behaviour of citizens. This study will focus on the last of these characteristics in the context of the corporate world.
Because government awards are often bestowed upon chief executive officers (CEOs) they can potentially influence corporate decision making. The impact may occur through two principal channels. The prospect of receiving an award in the future might alter the incentives of the CEO and the decisions made today (ex ante effect). Or the receipt of a government award might lead to subsequent changes in corporate practices (ex post effect) once the CEO has been awarded. However, it is empirically challenging to study the relationship between government awards and corporate outcomes due to the endogenous relationship between awards and behaviour. For instance, if one in a cross-section finds that the firms run by CEOs that have been awarded government awards are more profitable than firms that are run by CEOs who have not received an award, then is this because the government award spurred a better performance or is it because CEOs who perform well get rewarded?
To overcome this empirical challenge, I utilize a set of quasi-natural experiments: The staggered introduction of orders of merit in the constituent states of Germany. Since 1957, 14 of the 16 German federated states have introduced orders of merit as forms of official recognition to individuals for 'contributions for the benefit of the state'. I use the six introductions of orders of merit that have taken place after German reunification in 1990 as identification. The main analysis consists of a set of regressions which estimate the change in various firm-level performance variables before and after such state government award systems are introduced relative to a control group of firms in states that are unaffected by each introduction using powerful econometric techniques in a generalized difference-in-differences framework. As a result of this unique empirical setting I am able to answer a range of questions that relate to both the ex ante and the ex post effects of how government awards impact on corporate behaviour.
First, I study if there is a general effect on corporate behaviour when a state award is introduced. As a result of their scarcity and desirability, awards in general can spur effort and increase output Tirole, 2003, 2006; Moldovanu et al., 2007; Frey, 2007; Besley and Ghatak, 2008) . With particular respect to awards given by governments we know that CEOs put a high value on receiving these nonmonetary government awards. This has been shown in the recent literature (Siming, 2016) , but is also evident from the reactions of honoured CEOs.
For example, upon receiving the French Légion d'honneur, Sidney Taurel, the CEO of pharmaceutical company Lilly, remarked: "I never imagined that I might ever be so honoured, and I cannot envision any form of recognition that could mean as much to me." (Lilly, 2001) .
It is however not clear that the incentive of the CEO to be awarded a state award is necessarily in the best interest of the shareholders. As is for example emphasized in the criteria of the Légion d'honneur one should '…have served the good of the nation rather than solely one's own interest (e.g. by creating jobs…)' (Grande chancellerie de la Légion d'honneur, 2015).
There can thus be a conflict between what is best for the nation and the owners of a firm. Raff and Siming (2016) show that governments can use the prestige from the awards they distribute to induce business leaders to uphold an excess number of employees, which lowers profits.
Hence, on the one hand the existence of government awards may encourage individuals to contribute positively to firm performance. On the other hand, the focus on creating jobs may come at the expense of corporate profits. I find that profitability--measured as Operating margin, ROE, and ROA--decrease following the introduction of state award systems in Germany in the period 1991 to 2015. By contrast, firm-level employment increases after a state award system is introduced. Thus, on an aggregate level, the introduction of government awards decreases corporate profitability and increases employment. Does this result imply that the German orders of merit should be abolished? From the viewpoint of shareholders that is a possible conclusion, but from a welfare-economics perspective the results are inconclusive and allow for different interpretations. On the one hand, orders of merit may lead to catering by politicians to workers at the expense of overall efficiency. On the other hand, the existence of these state awards is merited if one wants to maximize the joint surplus of shareholders and employees and the benefits to employees from more hiring exceeds the costs to shareholders.
Just because a state award is introduced it does not follow that all CEOs in that state will receive it. As mentioned above it is necessary that awards are bestowed scarcely if they are to remain prestigious and act as incentive devices. It has been documented that government awards can incentivize fighter pilots to perform according to the wishes of the government. Ager et al.
(2016) study victory scores of over 5,000 German pilots during World War II and find that the existence of awards for bravery can spur pilots to take more risks in combat. While awards induce all fighter pilots to try harder only the best pilots manage to score more without increasing their death rate. Average pilots win only a few additional victories but die at a much higher rate.
For my setting, the question at hand is then if the individual CEOs that will eventually be awarded behave differently than the CEOs who do not get the award. Thus, in terms of ex ante effects, the existence of government awards may on one hand spur business leaders to outperform their competition in their quest to be rewarded, but this quest may at the same time lead to the substitution of profitable projects to projects favoured by the ones who bestow the award, the politicians. I find that the firms of CEOs who are ultimately awarded do not display a different performance in terms of profitability compared to firms where the CEOs are not awarded. They do however uphold a significantly higher level of employees. This constitutes further evidence that a government may use awards as an incentive device to spur employment in the private sector. But the results also suggest that shareholders of firms where the CEO is actually honoured has less reason to question the existence of orders of merit compared to shareholders in firms where the CEO tries, but fails, to win the award.
Finally, I study if there are any ex post effects on profitability and employment after a CEO receives a government award. Though no study has ever analysed ex post effects stemming from government awards, there is evidence that behaviour may change after one receives other forms of awards. Malmendier and Tate (2009) show that CEOs significantly underperform after receiving major business press awards. By contrast, Neckermann et al. (2014) While the setting of my study is highly specific, the results are of general interest and contribute to several strands of the literature as this is the first study that incorporates the analysis of both the ex ante and the ex post effects of government awards into one combined setting. That the introduction of state government awards substantially decreases corporate profitability but increases employment confirms previous research on the effect on prestigious government awards (Raff and Siming, 2016) , but also adds to the general literature on CEOs' quest for status (Focke et al., 2017; Malmendier and Tate, 2009 ).
The finding that CEOs who ultimately receive the state award are not running less profitable firms, although they employ more people, contributes to the literature that documents how government awards can spur individuals to outperform (Ager et al., 2016) . Finally, the finding that the performance of honoured CEOs does not worsen after they have received their awards suggests that the ex post effects of government awards are closer to those documented by Neckermann et al. (2014) than those documented by Malmendier and Tate (2009) and is a result that calls for more research into the mechanisms of why government awards seems to act as incentive devices also after they have been bestowed.
I proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the German system of state orders of merit and the data I use. Section 3 presents my main findings, and Section 4 discusses the results from robustness tests. I conclude in Section 5.
Historical Background and Data
This section briefly describes the history of the state government awards in Germany with the purpose to explain why I use Germany as my empirical laboratory. I also explain where my data come from, and the limitations of my sources.
Historical Context
Nowadays, virtually every government in the world has a system in place to honour their citizens for various achievements. For example, France has two national and four ministerial orders of merit, Japan awards 7 different types of state orders, and the British honours system includes 10 orders of chivalry. Since these awards carry no economic value they fall into the category of positional goods, a term introduced by Hirsch (1976) to indicate non-monetary products and services whose value is a function of their desirability by others. While the norm is that these awards are bestowed by the ruling body or government of the nation, they may also be bestowed by federated state governments, which is for example the case in Austria, Canada, [Insert Table 1 about here] Table 1 The awards all have in common that they are wearable both to formal attire, in the form of crosses worn around the neck or on the breast, and for everyday wear in the form of lapel pins.
Another general--and for identification purposes, important--feature is that the award criteria, which are synthesized in the column (4), are virtually identical in that they all emphasize contributions to the respective state and its people.
Data
Due to restrictions in data availability I limit the study to the period after German reunification and focus on the states that have introduced state orders of merit since then.
Besides the five former states of the German Democratic Republic--Sachsen, Thuringen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt--who all introduced state orders of merit after they ascended into the Federal Republic, the set of states includes also SchleswigHolstein. I gather, by year and state, the names of all individuals who have been awarded a state order of these states from the webpages of the state governments. Companies of the Continental European Community. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the entire sample.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The sample period runs from 1991--the first year after Germany reunification took place on October 3, 1990--to 2015. In total, 67 CEOs have been awarded one of the six state orders of merit instituted in this period. Of the total number of 2,474 firm-year observations, 132
(2,342) relate to observations where the CEO has been (has not been) awarded a state order.
The relatively low number of awarded CEOs in the sample is expected since government awards by construction must be scarce in supply to fulfill their role as positional goods.
Throughout the analysis, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to minimize the impact of outliers. Corporate performance is expressed through three variables:
Operating margin is measured as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over sales; return on assets (ROA) measured as net income over the book value of assets; return on equity (ROE) measured as net income over the book value of equity. The means for operating margin, ROA, ROE, the number of employees, and total assets in column 1 (2) are the averages of all firmyear observations where the CEO has been (has not been) award a state order of merit. We note that there are no significant differences in terms of average performance between the two categories though firms where the CEO has been awarded are larger both in terms of the number of employees and in terms of total assets.
Corporate Effects of Government Awards
In this section, I examine how government awards of the German states affect corporate performance and employment in a range of generalized difference-in-differences estimation models.
Ex ante Effects of Government Awards
The most useful feature of the evolution of state awards in Germany from a research standpoint is that the German states introduced the award systems at different times. 
where Yt,i a is a vector of the following outcome variables during year t in firm i; operating margin measured as EBIT over sales; ROA measured as net income over the book value of assets; ROE measured as net income over the book value of equity; employment measured as the natural logarithm of the number of employees. The year-specific dummy variables at measure the common, economy wide shocks at time t. Thus, at controls for nation-wide shocks and trends that shape the dependent variables over time in Germany, such as business cycles, national changes in regulations and laws, long-term trends in dependent variables, etcetera. The firm-specific dummy variables bi measure the firm-specific components. Thus, bi controls for time-invariant differences in the dependent variables due to unexplained factors that differ across the firms i. The industry-specific dummy variables cj control for differences across various industries j. By including these fixed effects in the model, all of the cross-sectional variation gets removed; coefficients are driven by changes in variables after a firm experiences the introduction of an award in its state. It,i is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for each year that the state in which a firm is headquartered has a state award system in place, and zero otherwise. Thus, the coefficient d measures the change in the outcome variables stemming from the introduction of awards. This is the key coefficient of interest since it gives us a difference-in-differences estimator that shows the changes in the dependent variable following the introduction of state government awards in the treatment state, controlling for changes in the dependent variable among the control group of states that have, at the time, not introduced a state award system. As such, the specification is a generalization of the differencein-differences approach where the control group is constructed from the average of all firms in the sample, rather than from a different set of firms not ever experiencing any change in the existence of orders of merit.
Finally, x is a control variable for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of assets.
Size is a particularly important control variable as it captures many firm characteristics such as executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Core et al., 1999; Baker and Hall, 2004; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Gabaix et al., 2014) , quality of managers (Himmelberg et al., 1999) , capital structure (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003) and it may be a proxy for the probability of default (Shumway, 2001 ) and the volatility of firm assets (Fama and French, 2002) .
Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are clustered by state to account for possibility of withinstate interdependence in the residuals due to serial correlation (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results of model 1 are presented in Table 3 . The first three columns present results for the profitability outcome variables and the last column presents results for the employment variable. We see that the difference-in-differences indicator coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level in each of the three profitability specifications. The point estimates are moderately large, indicating that profitability decrease, depending on specification used, by between 0.5 to 1.2 percentage points following the introduction of state orders of merit. By contrast, the difference-in-differences indicator coefficient for the fourth outcome variable, firm-level employment, is positive with a coefficient of 3.5 percentage points that is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Overall, the results of 
Where, Yt,i equals the same outcome variables as in regression (1), It,i is as before an indicator variable that takes the value of one for each year that the state in which a firm is headquartered has a state award system in place, and zero otherwise, x controls for firm size, and at, bi, and cj again represent year, firm, and industry fixed effects, respectively. Lt,i is an award indicator equal to one from the year of the introduction of the order of merit in the state where the firm is headquartered up to the year in which the incumbent CEO receives the honour. If a CEO is awarded after their retirement, the indicator variable Lt,i takes the value one for the years of the CEO's tenure that overlap with the years in which there exists an order of merit in the state where the firm is headquartered. Thus, Lt,i is zero for all observations that relate to: A year in which no state award exists for the state in which a firm is incorporated; all years after the incumbent CEO was awarded; all incumbent CEOs that never receive an award. 3 Subsequently, g measures the relative ex ante behaviour in terms of profitability and number of employees of the firms whose CEOs will be awarded compared to the CEOs that are not awarded. As before, heteroscedastic robust standard errors are clustered by state. Table 4 presents the results.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The only case for which the difference-in-differences estimator g is statistically significant is for the level of employees. The firms of CEOs who will be awarded a state award have on average a higher level of employees by 7.2 percentage points, after controlling for size and fixed effects. Thus, the firms that are ultimately awarded do not reduce their profits more than those CEOs who are not awarded but they do uphold a higher level of employees, which constitutes further evidence that a government may use awards as an incentive device to spur employment in the private sector.
Ex post Effects of Government Awards
The previous section has shown the superior ex ante performance of CEOs before they receive an award. The question then remains if the ex post behaviour changes once a CEO actually gets rewarded. To investigate this question, I estimate the following fixed-effects model:
Yt,i = at + bi + cj + hKt,i +dIt,i + pxt,i + et,i
Where, Yt,i equals the same outcome variables as in regressions (1) and (2), It,i is again an indicator variable that takes the value of one for each year that the state in which a firm is headquartered has a state award system in place, and zero otherwise, x controls for firm size, and at, bi, and cj respectively represent year, firm, and industry fixed effects. Kt,i is an indicator variable equal to one for each year that follows upon the award of a state order to the incumbent CEO until the tenure as CEO ends, or the sample period ends. Kt,i is zero for all other observations. Thus, h measures the ex post behaviour in terms of profitability and number of employees of the firms whose CEOs have been awarded. Heteroscedastic robust standard errors are clustered by state. The results are presented in Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 (Hillman, 2015) . It is possible that the revocability of government awards spurs the CEO to perform well--or at least not to underperform--also after the honour has been bestowed. Essentially the state award remains an incentive also after it has been bestowed. Table 3 demonstrated that firm performance (firm level employment) decreased (increased) somewhat following episodes of orders of merit introductions. In this section I will address two related questions. The first is whether the documented impact was temporary or long-term. Second, I will explore the dynamics of changes in the outcome variables before and after the state awards introductions to ensure that the declining profitability and increasing levels of employment did not precede the creation of state orders of merit.
Robustness Tests

Dynamics of Government Award Introductions on Profitability and Employment
To clarify the timing of the impact of the introductions I examine the dynamics of the relationship between the years of introduction and outcome variables by augmenting regression
(1) with a series of time dummy variables. The purpose is to trace out the year-by-year effects of state awards introduction. The regression follows: In sum, neither changes in firm profitability nor changes in firm level employment precede awards introduction. By contrast, profitability is reduced and employment is increased following these introductions.
Placebo Tests
All of the results presented in Tables 3 to 5 Table 6 depicts the result from tests where the events studied in Tables 3 to 5 are assigned to placebo dates occurring prior and after the actual event years.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Panel A presents the results of regression (1) Across the panels I find that the indicator variables for performance and employment are all statistically insignificant at conventional levels, which suggests that the previously presented generalized difference-in-differences estimates do reflect the impact of state awards, and not simply differential trends in the various treatment and control groups caused by spurious events.
Accounting for Heterogeneity Across States
The models described in regressions (1) to (3) have a number of benefits in terms of controlling for differences across the physical location of the firms. First, the firm and industry fixed effects control for time-invariant differences in the outcome variables due to unexplained factors that differ across firms and industries. Second, the time fixed effects control for the Länder, 2015). Regional business cycles may thus introduce a bias into the results in Tables 3 to 5. I therefore re-estimate the analysis using an augmented version of the models in regressions (1) to (3) allowing the time effects, which are essentially business cycle effects, to vary across the states. In other words, I replace the year fixed effects in those regressions, at, with year-state fixed effects, which controls for business cycle effects in a state at time t. The benefit of this approach is that it reduces the likelihood that the estimates will be biased by a correlation between state cycles and award introductions. The cost comes in terms of a large number of lost degrees of freedom. The results are presented in Table 7 .
[Insert Table 7 about here]
We see from Table 7 that the replacement of year fixed effects to year-state fixed effects leads to one significant change. In Panel A, ROA, which was significant at the 10% level in Table 3 is no longer significant. All other difference-in-differences coefficients retain their significance, although with, generally, a slightly lower economic magnitude. Overall, the results of Table 7 suggest that the effects of government awards on corporate performance and employment cannot be explained away by the existence of regional business cycles.
Conclusion
To investigate the effects of government awards on firm profitability and employment, I
use the staggered introduction of orders of merit in Germany after the reunification as a quasinatural experiment. I employ a difference-in-differences estimation methodology that makes use of the cross-state, cross-year variation in the timing of awards introduction to assess the impact of awards. The three main results give support to the view that government awards function as systematic economic instruments of governance. First, the introduction of government awards substantially decreases corporate profitability but increases employment.
Does this result imply that the German orders of merit should be abolished? From the viewpoint of shareholders that is a possible conclusion, but from a welfare-economics perspective the results are inconclusive. Second, the CEOs who ultimately receive the state award are not running less profitable firms although they employ more people than those CEOs who do not win the award. Thus, shareholders of firms where the CEO is actually honoured has less reason to question the existence of orders of merit compared to shareholders in firms where the CEO tries, but fails, to win the award. Third, the performance of honoured CEOs does not worsen after they have received their awards. The last result is perhaps the most interesting one as it highlights a clear difference in the ex post functioning of awards given by the state vis-à-vis that of prestigious business press awards. Though more research would be needed, it is possible that this difference is due to the unique features of revocability that are attached to state awards. Table 2 . Employees and Size are measured through the natural logarithm of the number of employees and total assets, respectively. The sample runs from 1991 to 2015. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(1) Table 2 . Employees and Size are measured through the natural logarithm of the number of employees and total assets, respectively. The sample runs from 1991 to 2015. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(1) Table 3 (Table 4) [ Table 5 ]. Operating margin, ROA, and ROE are defined as in Table 2 . Employees and Size are measured through the natural logarithm of the number of employees and total assets, respectively. The sample runs from 1991 to 2015. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
(1) 
